Marketing Science current issue

Optimal Sales Force Diversification and Group Incentive Payments

Caldieraro, F., Coughlan, A. T. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:47 PST

In this research, we show that the interaction between territory allocation and sales force compensation—two key drivers of sales productivity—strongly affects the firm's profitability. We analyze an agency-theoretic model that jointly considers the degree of negative or positive correlation across territory outcomes, differences in territories' sales potentials, the agency problem with risk-averse salespeople, and the availability of both own-territory compensation elements, such as commission, and elements dependent on the performance of others, such as group commissions or tournaments.

We find that allocating salespeople to negatively correlated sales territories beneficially diversifies each salesperson's portfolio of sales outcomes when this allocation includes a group commission pay component, and can improve profitability even with a decrease in average territory sales performance. In a larger sales force, a balanced allocation of salespeople, coupled with a group commission, dominates an imbalanced allocation. Comparing piece-rate compensation (with or without a group commission component) to tournaments alongside the allocation problem, we find that tournaments are favored over piece-rate plans when territories are highly positively correlated, territory sales potentials are similar, and salespeople have a low disutility for effort and are not very risk-averse. A piece-rate plan conversely dominates a tournament when these conditions are reversed.

Self-Control and Optimal Goals: A Theoretical Analysis

Jain, S. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:47 PST

Consumers set goals to achieve a variety of objectives such as losing weight, saving for retirement, and achieving better health. A large body of literature in psychology and consumer behavior shows that goals can help consumers achieve these objectives. However, there is almost no research that examines how we should set optimal goals. The purpose of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework that examines how goals can help performance and how we should set optimal goals. We use the literature on hyperbolic discounting to model these issues. Our results show that goals can often increase performance but can also sometimes encourage procrastination. We show that some goals are worse than having no goals, even when the goals are achieved and the consumer exerts more effort because of the goal. We also find that the presence of goals can lead to myopic consumers behaving as if they were hyperopic. Our results also show that the most difficult goals should be assigned to consumers with moderate levels of motivation and self-control problems. We also find that it is sometimes optimal to set goals that are never achieved.

Empirical Analysis of Metering Price Discrimination: Evidence from Concession Sales at Movie Theaters

Gil, R., Hartmann, W. R. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:47 PST

Prices for goods such as blades for razors, ink for printers, and concessions at movies are often set well above cost. Theory has shown that this could yield a profitable price discrimination strategy often termed "metering." The idea is that a customer's intensity of demand for aftermarket goods (e.g., the concessions) provides a meter of how much the customer is willing to pay for the primary good (e.g., admission). If this correlation in tastes for the two goods is positive, a high price on the aftermarket good allows firms to extract a greater total price (admissions plus concessions) from higher-type customers. This paper develops a simple aggregate model of discrete-continuous demand to motivate how this correlation can be tested using simple regression techniques and readily available firm data. Model simulations illustrate that the regressions can be used to predict whether aftermarket prices should be above, below, or equal to their marginal cost. We then apply the approach to box office and concession data from a chain of Spanish theaters and find that high-priced concessions do extract more surplus from customers with a greater willingness to pay for the admission ticket.

Dynamic Customer Management and the Value of One-to-One Marketing

Khan, R., Lewis, M., Singh, V. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

The concept of one-to-one marketing is intuitively appealing, but there is little research that investigates the value of individual-level marketing relative to segment-level or mass marketing. In this paper, we investigate the financial benefits of and computational challenges involved in one-to-one marketing. The analysis uses data from an online grocery and drug retailer. Like many retailers, this firm uses multiple promotional instruments including discount coupons, free shipping offers, and a loyalty program. We investigate the impact of customizing these promotions on the two most important consumer decisions: the decision to buy from the store and expenditure. Our modeling approach accounts for two sources of heterogeneity in consumers' responsiveness to various marketing mix elements: cross-sectional differences across consumers and temporal differences within consumers based on the purchase cycle. The model parameter estimates are fed into a dynamic programming model that determines the optimal number, sequence, and timing of promotions to maximize retailer profits. A series of policy simulations show that customizing promotions leads to a significant increase in profits relative to the firm's current practice of uniform promotions. However, the effectiveness of various promotions varies because of both cross-sectional differences in consumers as well within consumer heterogeneity due to purchase cycle factors. For instance, we find that free shipping tends to be the preferred instrument for re-acquiring lapsed customers, whereas an across-the-board price cut (via a discount coupon) is the most effective tool for managing the segment of most active customers. Interestingly, we find that customizing based on within-customer temporal heterogeneity contributes more to profitability than exploiting variations across consumers. This is important because the computational burden of implementing the dynamic optimization to account for cross-sectional heterogeneity is far greater than accounting for temporal heterogeneity. Furthermore, targeting promotions based only on timing rather than the nature and magnitude of the offers across consumers alleviates the public relations risks of price discrimination. Implications for marketing managers are also discussed.

Retailers' Multichannel and Price Advertising Strategies

Zhang, X. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

Online retailing boasts two major advantages: convenience of home shopping and easy access to information. In this paper, I argue that these two features have important implications for retailers' channel and advertising decisions. Two major questions are addressed: When should a conventional bricks-and-mortar retailer adopt a multichannel strategy? When should a multichannel retailer use its website to advertise offline prices? Analysis shows that the answers hinge on the nature of the product, the retailer's costs, and the competitors' strategies as well as the competitiveness of the market. Multichannel retailing is not necessarily the best strategy for all retailers; no adoption, asymmetric adoption, and symmetric adoption of the strategy are all possible equilibria. Advertising the in-store prices online is not always optimal. Price advertising in multichannel retailing has a different effect when compared with conventional single-channel retailing. It helps coordinate the channels by shifting the sales from online to offline, which is particularly useful when margins online are relatively low. The finding that multichannel retailers can benefit from drawing consumers back to physical stores highlights the risk of boosting online sales without considering the adverse effect on the offline channel and indicates a shifting role of the Web in retailers' businesses.

Estimating the Value of Brand Alliances in Professional Team Sports

Yang, Y., Shi, M., Goldfarb, A. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

Brands often form alliances to enhance their brand equities. In this paper, we examine the alliances between professional athletes (athlete brands) and sports teams (team brands) in the National Basketball Association (NBA). Athletes and teams match to maximize the total added value created by the brand alliance. To understand this total value, we estimate a structural two-sided matching model using a maximum score method. Using data on the free-agency contracts signed in the NBA during the four-year period from 1994 to 1997, we find that both older players and players with higher performance are more likely to match with teams with more wins. However, controlling for performance, we find that brand alliances between high brand equity players (defined as receiving enough votes to be an all-star starter) and medium brand equity teams (defined by stadium and broadcast revenues) generate the highest value. This suggests that top brands are not necessarily best off matching with other top brands. We also provide suggestive evidence that the maximum salary policy implemented in 1998 influenced matches based on brand equity spillovers more than matches based on performance complementarities.

Business Models for Media Firms: Does Competition Matter for How They Raise Revenue?

Kind, H. J., Nilssen, T., Sorgard, L. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like TV channels raise revenue. A media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or the readers, if we consider newspapers), or by both. We show that the scope for raising revenues from consumer payment is constrained by other media firms offering close substitutes. This implies that the less differentiated the media firms' content, the larger is the fraction of their revenue coming from advertising. A media firm's scope for raising revenues from ads, on the other hand, is constrained by how many competitors it faces. We should thus expect that direct payment from the media consumers becomes more important the larger the number of competing media products.

Overselling in a Competitive Environment: Boon or Bane?

Lim, W. S. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

In this paper, we study the practice of overselling in a competitive environment where late-arriving consumers value the good higher than early-arriving ones but the former's arrival is uncertain. We show that overselling is a dominant strategy for the firms. However, it can lead to a prisoners' dilemma situation in which all firms are worse off overselling. We further show that only when demand from the late consumers far exceeds the supply and there is a sufficiently high profit margin from reselling does overselling result in a Pareto-dominant outcome for the firms.

Comparative Advertising and In-Store Displays

Shaffer, G., Zettelmeyer, F. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

Manufacturers often have a choice of whether to advertise something positive about their own products without mentioning their rivals' products (a noncomparative ad) or whether to portray their rivals negatively in addition to promoting their own products (a comparative ad). In this paper we ask: First, if a manufacturer in a distribution channel can choose between a comparative ad and a noncomparative ad, all else being equal, which should it choose? Second, under what conditions would a manufacturer want to reinforce its advertising message at the point of sale with in-store displays, and when should the retailer allow the displays? Third, how does the possibility of in-store displays influence the manufacturer's choice of ad content? We find that a manufacturer will prefer to run comparative ads over noncomparative ads for advertising that is untargeted or that appeals primarily to the manufacturer's core consumers, and run noncomparative ads over comparative ads for advertising that appeals primarily to the rival's core consumers. We also find that in-store displays will be optimal for the manufacturer and its retailers if and only if they increase the overall joint profit of the retailer, the manufacturer, and its rival. Finally, we find that the possibility of offering in-store displays increases a manufacturer's incentive to run noncomparative ads. However, some comparative ads may be so attractive to the manufacturer that it will run them with or without retailer help. Our paper is the first to introduce a channel-based explanation for why manufacturers may or may not want to engage in comparative advertising.

Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel?

Wu, C.-C., Chen, Y.-J., Wang, C.-J. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

The existing marketing literature suggests that persuasive advertising elicits counteractions from competing manufacturers and consequently leads to wasteful cancellation of the advertising effects. Thus, persuasive advertising is widely perceived to be combative in nature. A series of previously published papers demonstrates that appropriate targeting may partially mitigate the combative nature of persuasive advertising in that either the rival manufacturer or the retailer may benefit. In this paper, we complement their results by demonstrating the possibility that every channel member may benefit from persuasive advertising, i.e., a Pareto improvement along the distribution channel, thereby leading to the conclusion that persuasive advertising need not result in channel conflict.

Focus on Authors

Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

No abstract available.

Call for Papers--Special Issue of Marketing Science on User-Generated Content (UGC): Deadline: January 15, 2010

Fader, P. S., Winer, R. S. — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 10:01:48 PST

No abstract available.